INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON RADICALIZATION & EXTREMISM
21 - 23 OCTOBER 2019
ANKARA

www.icare4all.org
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PREFACE

In the summer of 2014, the military advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) following years of military build-up attracted a gradually increasing attention on the group. From the marginalization of the Sunni population after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and economic and political problems of reconstruction in Iraq to the group’s vast economic resources as well as the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), many factors were called in to analyze this phenomenon.

In the last several years, especially after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa and ISIS’ territorial retreat, another main research line came to the fore to explain the post-ISIS era. Even though the group lost a significant amount of its physical space, prestige, and financial resources, it still has the potential to survive as ISIS 2.0 with the remaining manpower, capability to inspire attacks worldwide, and its digital legacy. Despite of the group’s perceived military defeat, its resilience will keep the scholars of international security busy on the subject.

In this research, ORSAM Security Studies Expert, PhD, Lecturer Göktuğ Sönmez provides an analysis of the key challenges ahead of us vis-a-vis the ISIS threat. Dr. Sönmez focuses on the group’s new modus operandi, the concerns over returning foreign terrorist fighters and how to devise proper strategies for them, post-ISIS 1.0 competition in a broad geographical area stretching from Sub-Saharan Africa to Central Asia and the digital presence and legacy of the group which would quite possibly keep inspiring many other groups even after it experiences a significant demise. It is expected and hoped that this study would contribute to the growing literature on post-ISIS or ISIS 2.0 era, provide policy-makers with valuable perceptions and open up new paths for future research on the subject.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Uysal
Director of ORSAM
COMMITTEES

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Abdel Bari Atwan – Writer and Author Editor in Chief of Raialyoum Newspaper
Dmitriy S. Tulupov – St.Petersburg State University
Hisham Alhashimi – Iraqi Advisory Council
Jesse Morton – Parallel Networks
Md. Thowhidul Islam – International Islamic University Chittagong
Mubinoddin Shaikh – National Security & Counter Terrorism Consulting
Sara Zeiger – Hedayah
Sheelagh Brady – RAN
Simon A. Purdue – Northeastern University
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Asst. Prof. Göktuğ Sönmez – ORSAM Necmettin Erbakan University,
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Icare4All IT Expert

Gökhan Batu – ORSAM

S. Pınar Demirci – ORSAM
# PROGRAM SCHEDULE

**21 October 2019**

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<td><strong>OPENING CEREMONY</strong></td>
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<td>09:30-10:15</td>
<td><strong>Tulipia-1 Opening Speeches</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30-11:45</td>
<td><strong>PANEL 1: The Turkish Experience and Efforts: A Fact Sheet</strong></td>
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<td>Moderator: Aylin Sekizkök, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ufuk Ayhan, Turkish National Police Academy</td>
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<td>Ramazan Seçilmiş, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management</td>
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<td>Dr. Hüseyin Şık, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Justice General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses</td>
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<td>Sema Yiğit, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidency of Religious Affairs</td>
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| 13:00-13:15  | PANEL 2: The Role of New and Old Media and Cyber Dimension | Tulipia-1  | *Moderator: Abdel Bari Atwan, Writer and Author, Editor in Chief of Raialyoum Newspaper, Five Key Words to Understand the Surge of Radicalism in the Middle East*  
|              |                                                   |            | - Harun Karcic, Al Jazeera Balkans  
|              |                                                   |            |   Bosnia as a Hotbed of Muslim Extremism? An Analysis of How Balkan Media Frame Bosniak Muslims  
|              |                                                   |            | - Prof. Arije Antinori, Sapienza University of Rome  
|              |                                                   |            |   Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the (Cyber-)Social Ecosystem  
|              |                                                   |            | - Emine Çelik, Necmettin Erbakan University  
|              |                                                   |            |   Dark Web, Crypto Currencies and Non-State Armed Actors  
|              |                                                   |            | - Zainullah Nasiri, On Dokuz Mayis University / Nilab Saeedi, Ibn Haldun University  
|              |                                                   |            |   Extremism via Social Media Platforms in Afghanistan  
| 13:15-14:30  | LUNCH                                            | Tulipia-2  |                                                                            |
| 14:30-15:45  | PANEL 3: Formers’ Experiences and Their Potential Role in P/CVE Efforts | Tulipia-1  | *Moderator: Jesse Morton, Parallel Networks*  
|              |                                                   |            | - Jeffrey Stephen Schoep, Parallel Networks  
|              |                                                   |            |   Prevention/Intervention Specialist & Extremism Consultant  
|              |                                                   |            |   American Nazi: (Radical to Redemption) Countering Modern Extremism  
|              |                                                   |            | - Jason Walters  
|              |                                                   |            |   In and Out of Extremism. An Existentialist Perspective  
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### PANEL 4: Legacy of ISIS: A Discussion Covering its Rise, Decline, and Aftermath

**Moderator:** Mubinoddin Shaikh, National Security & Counter Terrorism Consulting

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<td>16:00-17:30</td>
<td>Tulipia-1</td>
<td>• Rashad Ali, ISD &lt;br&gt;Geopolitical, legal and strategic context to repatriation policies of returning foreign fighters</td>
<td>• Stephanie Elisabeth Spyra, Second Lieutenant, German Armed Forces &lt;br&gt;Cubs of the Caliphate – How to Deal with a New Generation of Child Soldiers</td>
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<td>• Prof. Omar Ashour, Doha Institute - University of Exeter &lt;br&gt;The Military Impact of Foreign Fighters: The Case of ISIS</td>
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19:30 Tulipia-2

GALA DINNER

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**22 October 2019**

### PANEL 5: Hedayah: Think and Do Approach

**Moderator:** Murat Uzunparmak, Hedayah, Director of Research and Analysis

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<td>09:00-10:30</td>
<td>Tulipia-1</td>
<td>• Sara Zeiger, Hedayah, Program Manager &lt;br&gt;A presentation about the Hedayah Program and Activities / Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Tunisian Youth</td>
<td>• Farangiz Atamuradova, Hedayah, Research Associate &lt;br&gt;Far-Right Counter Narrative Collection</td>
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10:30-10:45 COFFEE BREAK
### PANEL 6: Foreign Fighters, Returnees and DDR

**Moderator:** Sheelagh Brady, RAN, Interviewing Extremist Prisoners Understanding How Their Perspectives Can Inform Policy

- **Ahmet Yusuf Özdemir, Istanbul Commerce University**
  Why They Go Where They Go: Making Sense of Foreign Fighters' Destination Choice

- **Sebastian Joris, Chief Superintendent Belgian Federal Police Liaison Officer**
  Belgium Experience about Rehabilitation of Returnees

- **Prof. Ayşe Dilek Öğretir Özçelik, Gazi University**
  Analysis of the Syrian Children the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Empathy and Depression Levels

**10:45-12:00 Freesia**

### PANEL 7: Global Reach of Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter It

**Moderator:** Irfan Saeed, US State Department
Building the Case for Prevention and Intervention- A Global Strategy for CVE

- **Alexander Malkevich, Foundation for National Values Protection**
  Interaction of Non-Profit Organizations with Traditional and Social Media in the Framework of the Fight against Extremism and Terrorism

- **Dr. Marie Kortam, Institut français du Proche-Orient (Ifpo)**
  Violent Radicalisation and Extremism in Lebanon: The EU Role

- **Mesenbet Assefa Tadeg, ICEPCVE**
  Elements and Patterns of Religious Extremism in Ethiopia

**10:45-12:00 Lilium**

**12:00-13:15 Tulipia-2**

**LUNCH**
## PANEL 8 : Global Reach of Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter It -2

**Moderator:** Mattias Sundholm, Strategic Communications Officer, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)

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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Freesia</td>
<td>Lisa Letschter, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)</td>
<td>Community engagement and inclusion: A human rights-based approach to CVE</td>
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<td>Bilgehan Öztürk, SETA Foundation</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Approach</td>
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<td>Dmitrii Tulupov, St.Petersburg State University</td>
<td>Preventiveness as a Major Defect in the Design of a Counter-Terrorism Warfare: the Case of the US Global War on Terrorism (GWoT)</td>
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<td>Samuel Teshale, ICEPCVE</td>
<td>The IGAD Regional Strategy to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism</td>
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## PANEL 9 : Global Reach of Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter It -3

**Moderator:** Sammy Rangel, Life After Hate, Inc.
The Pioneering Movement: Dismantling Hate with Our Humanity

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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Lilium</td>
<td>Frank Meinek</td>
<td>Humility + Empathy = Humanity</td>
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<td>Simon Purdue, Northeastern University</td>
<td>William Pierce and the Gender Politics of the Extreme-Right</td>
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<td>Sipos Xénia Zsuzsanna, Corvinus University of Budapest</td>
<td>Tunisia's Path to Radicalization: A Lost Generation?</td>
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<td>Dr. Bahija Jamal, Faculty of Law, Hassan II University-Casablanca</td>
<td>Perception of ISIS Moroccan Women in the Counter Terrorism and Human Trafficking Policies: Are They Perpetrators or Victims?</td>
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**14:30-14:45**  **COFFEE BREAK**
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<td><strong>PANEL 10: Global Reach of Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter It</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak Yavcan, TOBB-ETU</td>
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<td>• Sinan Hatahet, OMRAN</td>
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<td>The Financial Aspect of Non-State Actors Including Terrorist Organizations such as PYD and HTS</td>
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<td>• Asst. Prof. Dr. Gülriz Şen, TOBB-ETU</td>
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<td>Assessing the Role of Women in Fighting Radicalization in Turkey</td>
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<td>• Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, Researcher</td>
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<td>Understanding Role of Gatekeepers: Turkey’s Mukhtar Capacity in terms of P/CVE</td>
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<td><strong>PANEL 11: Turkish National Police Academy Panel</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Prof. Dr. Bayram Ali Soner, Turkish National Police Academy</td>
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<td>• Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Tınas, Turkish National Police Academy</td>
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<td>Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters and Returnees: Case Study of Syria and Iraq</td>
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<td>• Asst. Prof. Dr. Oğuzhan Yanarışık, Turkish National Police Academy</td>
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<td>The Role of Media in Radicalization Process: The Case of YPJ</td>
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<td>• Res. Assistant Hakan Kıyıcı, Turkish National Police Academy</td>
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<td>Ideological Infighting against al-Qaeda: The Case of Yemen</td>
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### PANEL 12: The Way Forward

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<td>Moderator: Amb. Christian Berger, The Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey</td>
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<td>- Aylin Sekizkök, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>- Sara Zeiger, Hedayah, Program Manager</td>
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<td>- Asst. Prof. Dr. Göktuğ Sönmez, ORSAM Security Studies Director</td>
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<td>The Age of Radicalism and The Way Forward</td>
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### Closing Program

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<td>Prof. Dr. Ahmet Uysal, ORSAM Director</td>
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<td>Amb. Christian Berger, The Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey</td>
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<td>Mr. Süleyman Soylu, Republic of Turkey, Minister of Interior</td>
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ABSTRACTS
GLOBAL TERRORISM: IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AN (UNCONVENTIONAL) ARAB PERSPECTIVE

In recent years, an entire industry has evolved that is devoted to addressing the ideological challenge of terrorism. Academics and journalists, think-tanks and public relations firms, security consultancies and intelligence agencies have all been engaged in the task of understanding and countering the belief systems supposedly underpinning the terrorist phenomenon.

In relation to the Arab world, the ailment is invariably diagnosed as the intolerant interpretations of the Islamic faith espoused by militant takfiris or other groups described as terrorist. And the cure – apart from purely punitive measures -- is considered to be ‘de-radicalization,’ aimed either at dissuading young people, especially, from adopting such ideas and attitudes, or persuading those who have already been lured by them of the error of their ways. In addition to various educational initiatives, this effort has taken a variety of forms in various places: from requiring schoolteachers in the UK to report suspected ‘terrorist’ leanings among their pupils, to widespread internet and communications surveillance worldwide, to the establishment of special centres to rehabilitate repentant jihadis in countries like Saudi Arabia.

I will not comment on the effectiveness or otherwise of these de-radicalization measures as they apply to individuals. But taking a broad view, I would argue that an excessive focus on the ideological aspect of terrorism and the challenges it poses is misguided – both as an analytical tool and as a basis for policy-making.

Terrorism is not an ideology. It is a tactic. It is political violence employed in certain ways, depending on one’s precise definition. It is also a label: a political slur that delegitimizes the perpetrators and often, by extension, their cause. It may be a cliché to say that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter, but it is no less true for that. It is also true that the label has always been applied selectively and inconsistently, in accordance with the power, politics and interests of both the labeller and the labelled.

To illustrate this from a personal perspective, as a Palestinian, all my life I have seen my people’s national struggle labelled as ‘terrorist’ by Israel and its Western backers. Initially, their analysts would depict this terrorism as a product of primitive nativism and Arab nationalist ideology. As the Cold War progressed, our terrorism became attributed to Soviet-inspired revolutionary Marxist ideology. In later decades, Islamic fundamentalism became the ideological force supposedly driving our incorrigible terrorist behaviour. I mention this to illustrate two points. First, the abuse of the ‘terrorist’ label to eclipse a political cause and reduce it to a kind of collective mental pathology. Secondly, how, over time, that political cause can change the ‘ideological’ colours in which it is expressed – in line perhaps with broader changing ideological ‘fashions’. The ‘ideology’ changes but the underlying cause remains, and continues for the same objective reasons to generate political violence.
None of this is to excuse or justify terrorist acts or their perpetrators, nor question the need for action to be taken to protect societies from them or for tolerant and pluralist values of be actively promoted in the communities that spawn them. But it is important to reiterate these basic truths, because they are increasingly being forgotten, or wilfully disregarded, in the Arab world today.

In the Arab world, the states most closely identified with the ‘war on terror’ are pursuing approaches to it that are to a great extent self-serving, short-sighted and ultimately counter-productive – if the aim is genuinely to combat the perpetrators of political violence and the ideologies that drive them.

For one thing, in the past few years, the number and range of organizations, individuals and governments they have designated as ‘terrorist’ has expanded so vastly that it has become meaningless.

The clearest example of this is the ‘terrorist’ designation applied by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and various of its offshoots and other non-violent Islamist political groups and figures. The reason for this is nakedly political: part of a campaign by ruling regimes to reverse the region-wide Islamist political resurgence in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 (selective thought this campaign may be: where expedient, such as in Yemen and Syria, Brotherhood-affiliated groups have remained in these countries’ good graces).

In Egypt, this ‘terrorist’ designation has been used to justify vicious repression, the killing of thousands and the jailing of tens of thousands of Brotherhood supporters and supposed sympathizers, accompanied by a wider draconian crackdown against all and any dissent or independent political action, liberals and leftists included. The Brotherhood is far from blameless, either in terms of its historical role or during its brief stint in power in Egypt. But the ferocious crackdown against it not only demonizes its latter-day brand of moderate, civil-minded political Islam, but also signals to its followers that they have no prospect of promoting their convictions by democratic of peaceful means. The prisons have been filled with aggrieved activists, arbitrarily arrested and badly mistreated, while civil society as a whole has been suffocated mercilessly and public space subjected to a comprehensive shut-down. One could scarcely imagine conditions more guaranteed to fuel and encourage ‘terrorist ideology’ – all in the name of combating it.

The same can be said of the government’s approach to combating the groups already infected with the ‘terrorist’ bug, in Sinai and elsewhere. This has focused on the use of iron-fisted security measures and full-scale military force, with little regard for the marginalized local populations out of whose long-neglected socio-economic grievances these groups originally emerged, later attracting like-minded outsiders.

In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the ‘terror’ label is also increasingly being used to silence and detain other critical or independent voices – including but by no means confined to Islamists -- greatly restricting the public sphere for debate or airing social, economic or political grievances and demands. This too is a perfect recipe for driving dissent underground and destroying any faith in the possibility of effecting change by peaceful means – in other words, helping to nurture ‘terrorist ideology’. Yet the governments concerned loudly trumpet their anti-terrorist, modernizing and reformist credentials.

Meanwhile, these countries conveniently disregard their own roles in spawning the region’s most egregious ‘terrorist’ groups, either by directly sponsoring them to achieve political goals such as in Syria, or indirectly by supporting the US invasion of Iraq (which led to the creation of the Islamic State) or the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan (which gave birth to al-Qaeda).

Even Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement that controls the Gaza Strip, has made it onto the Saudi and allied ‘terrorist’ list, even though the kingdom was until recently on relatively good terms with the group. This designation seems related primarily to Saudi Arabia’s desire to befriend Israel, rather than Hamas’ Brotherhood affiliation as such. But it has nothing to do with actual ‘terrorist’ behaviour or ideology. Indeed, Hamas’ political platform has become strikingly moderate in the past few years, and its previous paramilitary actions were always confined to Israeli targets within historic Palestine. The ‘ter-
terrorist’ designation sends out the message that nothing is to be gained from this relative moderation and restraint, either for the group or for the besieged and embattled Palestinians of the Gaza Strip. Should we be surprised if this fuels the growth of hardline jihadi groups in the Strip? Whatever its portrayal in the West, nobody in the Arab world ever used to consider Hamas to be ‘terrorist’.

The same can be said of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, whose actions have only ever been directed at Israeli occupation forces and military targets, yet finds itself designated as ‘terrorist’ by Saudi Arabia and its allies for reasons unrelated to any ‘terrorism’ but for entirely political considerations – to do with Israel, the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, the situation in Bahrain, and the over-arching regional rivalry with Iran.

Here too, we are seeing the language of anti-terrorism used in a manner that actually fuels the ideology of terrorism. Saudi Arabia and its allies are engaged in a fierce war of words with Iran. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the two sides’ disputes, this war is being waged in increasingly sectarian terms. Official pronouncements and media coverage routinely couch the struggle against Iran as one against Shi’ism and the Shi’a and their millennial beliefs, depicting them as an ideologically-driven existential threat and as the font of global terrorism. Given the dominance of Saudi and Gulf-controlled pan-Arab media, this has contributed greatly to the alarming growth in crude sectarian attitudes and discourse in the public sphere that we have seen throughout the Arab world in recent years. But it is playing with fire to stoke anti-Shia prejudices among Sunnis (or vice-versa) as a way of rallying support against a regional rival. Ultimately, it draws on the same well of bigoted takfiri intolerance which – in other contexts – everyone now claims to be combating.

This has extended to the horrific and futile war in Yemen, which was launched virtually on a whim three years ago to burnish the new Saudi leadership’s credentials. It thought it could prevail over the lightly-armed Houthis within weeks and restore its deposed allies to power in Sanaa. But the more the Saudi-led coalition gets bogged down in the conflict, the more it depicts it as a struggle against a menacing Iranian-sponsored Shia (and terrorist, of course) threat from its impoverished neighbour. In the real world, meanwhile, one of the intervention’s main outcomes has been to strengthen the position of al-Qaeda and similar groups in the south of the country – while creating what has been described as the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet. The aim of causing all this suffering, despair and resentment, we are told, is to combat terrorism. But what could be a better incubator of ‘terrorist ideology’?

That ideology can take many forms and need not be religious: the Kurdish PKK’s avowed secularism does not prevent it from being designated as terrorist by Turkey’s NATO allies (even while they sponsor its offshoots in Syria to suit their purposes!). Ultimately, ideology is a shell. The root cause of political violence lies in tangible political, social or economic grievances, mostly related to domestic misrule and/or foreign occupation and military intervention. It has thrived above all in the ‘failed states’ produced by the combination of these two factors, such as Libya, Iraq and Syria. Terrorist ideology can take on a life of its own, of course, and induce horrific behaviour, and serious efforts are required to counter both. But that will always be a secondary factor unless and until those underlying causes are tackled.

This may sound like a statement of the obvious, but it has to be made given current circumstances and attitudes in the Arab world. Using the ‘terrorist’ label to consolidate domestic power or pursue regional rivalries may be expedient. But in the ways they are waging their supposed wars on terror, Arab governments are recreating the conditions that generated the phenomenon in the first place.

Reducing terrorism to an ideology serves to belittle, discredit or deny the root causes, and to avoid tackling or drawing attention to them. It could be concluded, therefore, that a large part of the ideological challenge in combating terrorism lies in combating the ideology that deems ‘terrorism’ to be an ‘ideology’.
WHY THEY GO WHERE THEY GO;
MAKING SENSE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS’ DESTINATION CHOICE

History of modern transnational war volunteers, or popularly known as “foreign fighters”, can be traced back to almost 250 years. Yet up until the Syrian civil war this phenomenon didn’t receive that much attention but instead studied as a subfield of international terrorism. The unprecedented nature in the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq in a very short time frame caught many by surprise. The conflict differed from other historical examples with the highest number of European citizens participating in a non-European war. Mobilization started number of debates within the academic circles, think tanks, policy makers and international community ranging from why these people fight in somebody else’s war to how to prevent these flows. Subsequent terrorist attacks in European cities by perpetrators who either trained in Syria and Iraq or sworn allegiance to groups that are operating in the area led literature to focus on specific group of foreign fighters. This also gave rise to studies on radicalization and violent extremism which examined psychological, sociological, economic and ideological drives behind one’s decision to travel. This led some scholars to argue that the movement signifies a departure from nationalistic tendencies and exemplify a type of transnational identity. Others mostly focused on the role of religious literature the groups use to recruit foreign fighters. However although individuals’ participation in these wars symbolizes a gesture as to leave his or her past (either family or country) behind, current international political system doesn’t allow it to happen. In a sense foreign fighters are part of the very system that they are claiming to challenge. This paper argues that this can be explained by answering the question why more foreign fighters participate in a specific conflict (i.e. Syria or Afghanistan) than others (i.e. Somalia or Chechnya). There might be several different approaches to answer this question. One aspect is whether groups in the conflict called for outsider help and how they treat foreigners on their side. In addition to that the portrayal of the war whether it is a war against an oppressor, a foreign invader or for an Islamic State may affect the process. However this paper attempts to examine the role of geography plays in foreign fighter travel destination. As addressed by the United Nations Security Council resolutions (both in 2178 and 2396) the geographical location of the conflict zone, ability and easiness to cross borders and accessibility to the region need be more included to the discussion. During the process not only the country that the conflict taking place but also the neighboring states needs to be taken into account since foreign fighters travel through the borders. Travelers in that sense use the power of passports they hold and benefit their countries’ bilateral relations with regional countries, especially with regards to the visa policies. Instead of examining a single case study this paper adopts a holistic approach with different historical and geographical examples and attempt to contribute the ongoing discussion to understand the nature of foreign fighter mobilization.
The Foundation for National Values Protection is the only Russian research organization involved in studies of the situation in most African countries. For this reason, representatives of the Foundation were invited as moderators of the thematic section “Image of the future “Africa 2040”: traditions and national values” within the framework of the summit “Russia-Africa,” to which the heads of all African states and the largest regional organizations of the “black continent” are invited.

One of the priorities of the Foundation is to analyze the situation in Libya. Since spring 2019, our experts have conducted several large-scale sociological studies on the territory of the former Jamahiriya. Representatives of local NPO’s have repeatedly helped the Foundation’s employees to implement these projects. In particular, the researchers received support from the staff of the “Mandela Libya” organization. Representatives of the Foundation have regularly faced political extremists directly. Two employees were abducted by one of the commanders, controlling Tripoli and placed in the notorious Mitiga prison. Therefore, the presented research is based primarily on personal experience gained in the process of trying to save the employees of the Foundation and local activists who helped them, rather than on third-hand facts.

Modern Libya cannot be called a democratic state. The authors of the Freedom House rating: Freedom in the World of 2018 gave the former Jamahiriya only 196 place of the 208. It is naturally reflected in the position of the media: in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2018 ranking, compiled by the “reporters without borders” organization, Libya took 154 place out of 180.

However, both independent media fighting against religious and political extremism and NPO’s cooperating with them continue to exist in Libya. One example of the latter is “Mandela of Libya” organization and the Association of Lawyers for Justice in Libya. Social media is the central platform where cooperation between NPO’s and the media takes place currently.

Interestingly, the leading role in this tandem of journalists and human rights defenders is played by representatives of Internet platforms. As noted by UNDP and UNICEF, most NPO’s in Libya are quite small. The average number of their members is 45 people, and the vast majority of them do not have paid staff.

INTERACTION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

By: Alexander Malkevich, PhD in Political Science, President of the NGO “Foundation for National Values Protection”
Together, journalists and human rights defenders have conducted several public campaigns and organized some investigations. Despite modest resources, this human rights tandem has made substantial progress. As the most striking example, in this case, we can cite the release of participants of Comic Con Libya-2017. In November 2017, the so-called “law enforcement” from Tripoli arrested over 120 people just for visiting this comics festival. The reason for this was the “propaganda” of a lifestyle contradictory to Sharia law. Those detained were tortured and beaten, and it was only through the intervention of the media and human rights activists that they escaped the worst fate of being placed in the infamous Tripolitan prison of Mitiga.

Recently, however, the potential of the alliance of media and human rights NPO’s to counter extremism has been significantly reduced.

Being subjected to pressure from state structures and related religious extremists, human rights defenders also face censorship by the administration of social networks. It should be noted with regret that social media gradually increase the scope of censorship and use double standards and extremely vague criteria when evaluating content.

Between October and December 2017, Facebook deleted about 1.6 million posts containing signs of “hate speech.” For the period from July to September 2018, this figure amounted to 2.9 million. 4.5 thousand moderators worked in Facebook in May 2017. According to the data as of February 2018, this number grew to 7.5 thousand.

At the same time, no clear rules are governing the resolution of conflicts between representatives of protected communities. It is imposed by the lack of clear criteria for unacceptable behavior, which results in severe disputes.

Thus, human rights defenders experience double pressure – from the authorities and moderators of social networks. This pressure can only be resisted by rallying at the national level while coordinating closely with representatives of international organizations. Only in this case, human rights defenders will be able to provide the necessary conditions for the deployment of full-fledged work.
Bangladesh’s progress is burgeoning faster while also facing many challenges from different sectors. The country gains its independence based on the ideas of secularism, justice, equity and freedom. After Killing of the Father of Nation, the principle of secularism was replaced by the principle of religion. Amid those developments, some Bangladeshi people joined Soviet-Afghan war in 1980s who are strongly motivated by the religion. This was the first wave of radicalization in Bangladesh. Then, the ever growing radicalization and the showdown of its protagonists have been displayed through the attack of Holey Artisan Bakery on 26th of July in 2016. Currently, political violence and instability is the main cause of radicalization in Bangladesh. Absence of voting rights, political intra-grouping, violence, politically motivated cases, illegal power exercise and so on represents last 10 years of shaky political situation and culture. Manipulation in social media, hate speech against different religion and groups and attack on minority are on the rise. Youth people are more prone to be radicalized than adults, who are from the above 50 age group. This study aims to explore the consequences of radicalization focusing on the south-west part of Bangladesh. It is conducted using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Simple random sampling method as a sampling producer and semi-structural questionnaire were used to collect data when the field survey was conducted. In-depth interview and Focused Group Discussion used as tools of data collection.
The transition from the analogue world to the digital globalized world represented a crucial turning-point for mankind. The development of technology, the growth of the internet and the spread of social media platforms affect the media consumption, with relevant impacts on "online citizens" and followers throughout the world. The digital convergence, social mobile media evolution and spread of mobile culture in human interaction are some of the most important phenomena of contemporaneity. At first, they gave life to a new dimension of human existence, then gradually fostered the rise and increasing centrality of (cyber-)sociality. A wide variety of people activities of contemporary society takes place in the (cyber-)social ecosystem. it produces significant change in the daily life of individuals, especially the latest generations. all this also impacts, in a way never seen before, on deviant and criminal phenomena, such as radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Nowadays, the exploitation of internet and social mobile media multiplying the power, pervasiveness and effectiveness of propaganda and recruitment represent an extremely important "weapon" for terrorist and violent extremism groups, as well as a source of inspiration for lone actors.

Online propaganda constantly shifts on to new platforms, from social networks, to social and mobile media, from online repositories to micro-blogging and private channel. vulnerable individuals are exposed not just to traditional radicalization process and dynamics, but also more and more to intervening new issues related to the peculiarities of the (cyber-)social ecosystem mobile addiction, such as the spread of fake news and deepfake videos online, echo chambers and filter bubble effects, extreme polarization, gamification of violence, (cyber-)social self-isolation and “botization of knowledge”. “Terrorist avatarism” and live-streaming attacks represent the fruits of this complex and dangerous scenario involving ideological, ethnic and religious terrorist and violent extremist actors.

The viral spread of user-generated contents (UGCs) and the recourse to storyfication are not temporary trends. They have to be considered as completely new ways of self-representing for Millennials and successive generations characterized by totally different concepts of time, space, roots and beliefs. As a consequence of all that, it is no longer possible to speak of real world as opposed to “virtual” one. The lines between “online” and offline life, such as between virtual and real human experience, are blurring. The “onlife” scenario is to come in a few years. Therefore, in the near future, onlife ecosystem will be used by violent extremists and terrorists, as well as hostile entities and proxy actors, with the aim to spread disinformation and misinformation for setting the bases to carry out attacks.
It implies new (cyber-)social security challenges at the same time for governments, civil society, military, law enforcement and Intelligence agencies that need to develop new paradigms to deal with the growing complexity of “mediamorphosis” involving the unconventional, continuous and sudden change of online violent extremism and terrorism in terms of perception of reality, identity, participation, self-training and modi operandi.

It is evident that the increasing iper-complexity, giving by the interdependencies and hybridization between radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism contaminating the one and only (cyber-)social ecosystem will pose, in the near future, new challenges to national security and public safety that need to be addressed through strong awareness and knowledge of the nature of the threat deeply rooted in the present.
Turkey has been facing with migration for various reasons. More than half of those migrating from Syria to Turkey are children. After the war in Syria, a compulsory migration wave to Turkey has produced a huge challenge and still this wave of migration continues. Despite the fact that the whole world is silent and ignorant about the inhuman incidents in Syria, Turkey has opened its doors to these people and continues to provide all kinds of opportunities to these people. The regime in Syria is still violating human rights and persecuting its people. Millions of children today are in the state of wars, innocent victims of terrorist attacks, directly or indirectly. The traumatic effects of immigration on children after these acts of violence affect children psychologically, physiologically and socially. Although the responses of children to traumatic events are generally similar, differences can also be observed. It is defined as a traumatic experience for an individual if he or she perceives it as a real threat, if it is physically, psychologically or socially harmed or witnessed, or if he / she feels too much fear, helplessness and horror at this point. The effects of trauma can be physical, emotional, mental, physical and behavioral. Almost everyone who has a traumatic event is showing “stress reactions” and social adaptation and social cohesion problems. In this study, Syrian children constitute a sample group of children going on to the schools in the Altındağ District at the province of Ankara where migration of Syrian families is intense. It was aimed to measure the demographic characteristics of the Syrian children and three variables namely PTSD, empathy, and depression levels.

In this study, it was aimed to examine the levels of PTSD, empathy and depression in Syrian children. A total of 121 boys and 135 girls from Altındağ district of Ankara formed a sample group of 256 children. Personal Information Form, PTSD, Empathy and Depression Scale for Children were used in this study. In this study, gender, number of siblings, whether father and siblings are alive, mother’s education status, father’s education status, average income of the family, father’s working status, mother’s working status and domestic violence variables were examined. The results revealed that there was no meaningful relation between the gender of the children and the levels of PTSD, empathy and depression. The younger children’s trauma level and depression level was higher as well as the children whose father is alive. The empathy level is also higher and children’s PTSD and empathy levels have changed according to their siblings are alive or not. The depression level of children whose mothers did not work was higher. Children whose fathers did not work had a higher level of PTSD, empathy and depression. Children with violence
In the family had high levels of PTSD, empathy and depression, the empathy level of children with fewer siblings was lower, children whose income level was lower depression level was lower.

In this study, it was concluded that there was a statistically significant difference between the level of PTSD and depression and the level of age in Syrian children. According to this study, the PTSD level of children aged 8-9 years was higher than the PTSD level at 10-11 years. This indicates that young Syrian children are more affected by the trauma they experience. When analyzed in terms of depression level of Syrian children aged 8-9 was found to be higher than depression level at 12-15 years, similar to PTSD level. This also shows that the younger Syrian children are more affected by the trauma they experienced and their level of depression is higher. According to empathy level, there was no significant difference according to the age level of Syrian children. In this context, it can be said that age is not effective on empathy. Similarly, in a study by Bulut [36], there was no significant difference in terms of gender between girls and boys in the study of PTSD seen in children after the earthquake in terms of age and gender. On the other hand, the trauma level of the younger age group was significantly higher than the middle age group.
For centuries, Morocco’s geographical location attracted migratory flow. Morocco is a land of emigration, transit, asylum and also a coveted location for international and regional traffickers, smugglers and terrorist networks.

Morocco as many countries is confronted to certain criminal activities which transcend national jurisdictions such as: migrants smuggling, human trafficking and terrorist activities money laundering, cyber criminality, illicit drug trafficking, that all have actual or potential effect across national borders. In order to shed light on forms of transnational organized crimes affecting Morocco (State and population) the analyses is limited to two forms which are terrorism and human trafficking.

Terror threats in Morocco have become more frequent in recent years as Islamic radicalism has spread throughout North Africa. The country has been targeted by terrorist attacks that started with suicide bombing attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and further attacks in 2007 and 2011.

According to the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (CBJI), 1,664 Moroccan nationals are fighting with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) armed and 596 have been killed there, while 2,870 have been jailed. CBJI indicates in a recent early in 2018 that Moroccan women are also amongst female ISIS migrants as fighters and recruiters. 300 women have joined ISIS including 150 minors, while 150 of them have returned back to Morocco.

Morocco is as well confronted to human trafficking phenomenon. It is a source, destination, and transit country for victims human trafficking. Moroccan men, women residing abroad are exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking, primarily in Europe, the Middle East and in some African countries. For instance, Moroccan women are particularly forced into prostitution and are considered recently as sex object (ISIS brides) in the holy land of “Al-Khilafa”.

Moroccan women are at the crossroad of terrorism and human trafficking. These women could be actors of terrorism as well as victims of human trafficking. Some of them are lured in a way that affects their decision to join the ranks of the ISIS extremist group.

By: Dr Bahija Jama, Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco

PERCEPTION OF ISIS MOROCCAN WOMEN IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICIES: ARE THEY PERPETRATORS OR VICTIMS?
To confront these forms of transnational organized crimes, Morocco has developed many legal and institutional measures. Since 2003, counterterrorism is treated in Morocco as a top policy priority, which is based on a multidimensional and integrated approach. Likewise, in 2016 Morocco has enacted a new law on human trafficking and adopted a broader definition of exploitation that includes the exploitation of a person to commit criminal acts or to get forcibly involved in armed conflicts.

This paper aims to explore the Moroccan Counter-terrorism policy and the current perception of Moroccan women of ISIS (I); and to provide insight into the new perception of these women, particularly the returnees, within the context of anti-human trafficking Moroccan policy (II).
Purpose of this report is to offer policy guidelines that may have a practical impact in the field of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) specifically for the Libyan context. Policy guidelines and recommendations that are offered in this report are based on our intensive research on Libya in the past year. Observations and recommendations that are offered in this research may also be useful for dealing with the problem of violent extremism (VE) in other fragile states in the region as well. Main objective of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy in this report is to assure sustainable stability for Libya, which had gone through a severe civil war and fragmentation in the aftermath of the February 2011 revolution. Maximum involvement of local actors and counterparts and increased cooperation and coordination among those actors is one of the fundamental suggestions of this report. We have a holistic and long-term perspective, which offers a long-term structural transformation for Libya to address the root causes of VE. Our perspective is based on a peacebuilding approach which aims to strengthen the involvement of local actors as well as strengthening the societal resilience. Our perspective is holistic rather than focusing on a particular aspect of CVE. Strategies that are offered in this report are part of a peacebuilding strategy rather than dealing solely with the aspects of direct violence. Intervention and destructive involvement of some external actors are possible triggers of VE in Libya. In the Libyan case, there are structural problems related to the weakness of state institutions. There are also problems within the civil society, where the civilian actors do not have the capacity and experience to function coherently and fill the gaps that were left by the fragile state. Society is also fragmented due to the authoritarian legacy, which left no space for autonomous functioning civilian institutions. In Libya, what opened the pandora’s box is the collapse of the state infrastructure after the collapse of the Qadhafi Regime. The state infrastructure and institutions were purposefully kept weak during the Gadhafi Regime. Similarly, the formal civil society was also very week leaving only tribal networks, family networks, and the mosques as informal domains of collaboration.

Reducing the uncertainty and re-integrating the society by building trust from bottom-up and institutionalization of the mechanism of trust seems to be the appropriate strategy for Libya according to our research. Trying to impose an externally driven straitjacket seems to be unsustainable and can lead to another round of conflict. Investing in the local Libyan capacity may not necessarily seem to be the most efficient approach, but it is the most sustainable one. However, we have to take into account the limitations that emerge due to the ongoing civil war which polarized the Libyan society. Civil war situation allows for external interventions to Libya, which further polarize the various segments of the Libyan society. The uncertainty in the field benefits the extremist factions and terrorist organizations. We will briefly outline the sources of the current problem of VE in Libya, and we will offer perspectives and policy guidelines that would address the underlying sources of VE. Prevention or at least mitigation of the ongoing confrontations should be the first step towards normalization and CVE in Libya. Ongoing uncertainty leads to or intensifies all other problems.
I particularly focus on the exploration of the political-ideological framework, which has taken its shape during the struggle between the community of Western states (primarily the United States) and the international (Islamist) terrorism movement. Since 2001 methodologically the US counter-terrorism strategy has been heavily reliant on the preventive action, which was in line with the national military doctrine in general. However, such an approach has not proven to be effective in the asymmetric warfare. By making an emphasis on combating terrorism by military means, the United States and the West in general have underestimated the importance of the ideological dimension of a struggle against terrorism. It seems, that Sunni extremism ideology has gain such a widespread acceptance among peoples, living in the Middle East, Sahel, Horn of Africa and South-East Asia, primarily because its “marketing model” neatly responds their ever-increasing demand for a development model, whose “brand” will be principally different from a Western democratic one. Thus, military strikes against terrorists or special operations, carried out under the auspices of a hostile ideological brand, will be mostly perceived by civilian majority in the terrorism-affected countries as illegitimate.

Another key feature of the structural asymmetry is the difference in the status of contestants. The paradox of the Global War on Terrorism is that a STATE has declared a war to a NON-STATE actor whose capacity to act is not bound to a particular state’s territory. But the problem is that applied means of a counter-terrorism warfare remain to be state-to-state and thus it is a state (its civilian population, infrastructure, military forces), which becomes first and foremost affected by a military strike. From a legal and moral perspective such a scenario might be presented as a disguised aggression, which is usually the case of a terrorists’ propaganda.

I conclude by arguing that the only option to conduct effective deterrence of the international terrorism is to abstain from the use of preventive military means and to shift to a more flexible and indirect management of this challenge, by facilitating the development of a counter-terrorism movement(s) in Muslim world, professing an ideology, which will be distinct from the Western democratic model by its form, but in its essence will be directed towards the same strategic goals as those, proclaimed in GWoT and CVE concepts.

By: Dmitrii Tulupov, St.Petersburg State University

PREVENTIVENESS AS A MAJOR DEFECT IN THE DESIGN OF A COUNTER-TERRORISM WARFARE: THE CASE OF THE US GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT)
DARK WEB: KRIPTO PARA BİRİMLERİ VE DEVLET DIŞI SİLAHLI AKTÖRLER

21. daha fazla aktif hale gelen devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin değişim ve dönüşümleri ülkelerin siyasi istikrarı eksikliklerini ve güvenilik zafiyetleri,ジェオポリティックコンサルタント、finansal hakimiyet, alan hakimiyeti gibi çeşitli parametreyle bağlı olarak gerçekleşmiş, teknolojinin ve internetin gelişimi ise bu değişim ve dönüşümün en önemli saç ayağı olmuştur. Devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin 2000'li yıllar itibariyle interneti propaganda, mili-

By: Emine Çelik, Necmettin Erbakan University
There are about 40-42 thousand FTFs in INTERPOL’s database from around 110 countries. Women are an important part of this huge figure with no less than 5 thousand females. They are not only victims but also perpetrators, disseminators of propaganda and even attackers themselves. With the addition of children, they would play a significant role in terms of raising the next generation of violent extremists. On the other hand, in the light of consequent related UN Security Council Resolutions and UNSC Resolution 2242, they can play a key gatekeeper role, too. Regarding foreign terrorist fighters, another interesting figure is that almost 20 percent of ISIS attacks were carried out by FTFs since 2014 and more strikingly, this figure jumps to 50 per cent when you included planning and financing of those attacks. With respect to their return and monitoring, UNSC Resolution 2369 has a great importance. Complex API and PNR systems are used by not more than 60 countries, leaving a lot of blind spots, which requires us to look probably more deeply into North Africa, Sahel, Central and East Asia in the coming years as well as the host and home countries of returnees. So, a related question is how to deal with returnees in that regard. Repatriation has its own risks since each returnee can act as the core of a new cell in a given place. Partly due to the difficulties of collecting accountable data from the battlefield and provide it to the courts as reliable evidence, prison times mostly vary between 5-15 years in Europe and in most cases it is under 10 years. A major challenge is also to assess how effective de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation and re-integration programs are let alone evaluating the outcomes. On the other hand, however, stripping of citizenship provides the very chance terrorist groups looking for, depriving somebody’s sense of belonging. And in case this is applied to kids, it becomes even more dangerous since they might be the next generation with such a lack of sense of belonging. The rise of far-right extremism and related terrorist attacks also pose an increasing threat to global security, too. Utoya, Christchurch and Halle attacks are quite symbolic in an atmosphere where far-right terror attacks witnessed a two- three-fold rise in recent years in many countries. Many new tools from drones to cyber-attacks and from social media propaganda to the use of cryptocurrencies are now in the repertoire of such groups. With the increasing capability for innovation, these new tools pose great challenges to all the parties involved and also highlight the importance of public-private cooperation, too. The lack of speed in terms of amending existing regulations and take innovative measures as well as of establishing institutionalised cooperation mechanisms between state institutions, NGOs, academics and private companies in a way that is beyond national boundaries can and do play into the hands of violent extremist groups.
One of the major discourses revolving around the terms ‘Muslim,’ ‘Bosniak’ and ‘Islam’ in Serbian and
Croatian media is terrorism. More specifically – the notion of Bosnia and Herzegovina being a hotbed of
Muslim extremism. Bosniak Muslims are represented, sometimes explicitly but more often subtly, as an
ethnic group that has ties to global radical Muslim groups. In most articles analysed during past years,
Bosnian Serb and Croat media have put forward the notion that radical interpretations of Islam date back
to the 1992-1995 war and that the number of followers of such radical interpretations has only increased
over the years. Retroactively, Bosnian Serb and Croat nationalists regularly try to portray their 1992-1995
war and genocide of Bosniak Muslims as a ‘war against Islamic fundamentalism.’ This element of alleged
religious extremism is often subtly claimed to be related to the allegedly inherently violent nature of the
religion itself, Islam, and to the role played by Muslim majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey
and Iran in aiding Bosniak Muslims during the war. In more recent years, with the raging war in Syria and
Iraq, the structures of these articles attempt to show a spill over effect of Middle Eastern conflicts onto the
Balkans, and Bosniak Muslims as being the primary carriers of the spill over effect. Authors of these texts
deploy radicalism as a frame in understanding Middle Eastern conflicts and Islam, the religion of Bosniak
Muslims, is utilized subtly as being a threat marker posed to the rest of the country and the region.

The aim of my work is to carry out a detailed research on how Serb and Croat media depict Bosniak Mus-
lims and their relation with religious extremism and political violence. The time frame for this research
will start with 1st September 2018 and finish on 1st September 2019.
Lebanon is a deeply sectarian country, with 18 officially recognised religious groups. It is affected by high unemployment and poverty rates. Alongside the demographic pressure generated by refugee flows, the combination of a fragmented society and poor economic prospects leads to political and social instability. Despite the flimsiness of the Lebanese political system, the country has managed to preserve a precarious political balance.

Local fragility and grievances compound the external and geopolitical factors. Such a complicated situation has heightened existing conflicts and political violence, including terrorism. It has created multiple paths toward radicalisation. The relative weakness of traditional Sunni organisations or political parties further exacerbates a sense of alienation. In the impoverished neighbourhoods of Tripoli, Sunni Islamist leaders are exerting a negative influence on youth as a result of the lack of control of Dar al-Fatwa, the primary Sunni public institution. Consequently, Sheikh Salem Rafei, a Salafi jihadist heading the Muslim Clerics Association, has been able to galvanise youth into fighting against the injustice and tyranny of the Syrian regime and the Alawite community.

This communication focuses on the causes of violent extremism and violent radicalisation in Lebanon and the role of the European Union (EU) in supporting Lebanon’s efforts to counter this threat. The conclusions present steps that could be taken by the Lebanese authorities and the EU going forward.
This article examines the role of social media as a means of expressing and disseminating ideologies and extremist narratives in Afghanistan.

Specifically, the purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which social networks are used to promote religiously-inspired political narratives and ideologies. The term “extremism” in this text is used to refer to the processes of the emergence and evolution of ideological tendencies and behavioral tendencies, which are characterized by a change in tolerance and levels of inclination toward violent behavior. Extremism as a process occurs at three levels.

This process has begun with thought, proceeding to speech, and eventually may lead to acts of violence.

In recent years, Afghanistan has experienced a significant expansion in social networks. Enhancing Internet access across the country, new space and new ways to connect and connect with each other and the outside world, and express their views on a wide range of social, political and security issues.

Internet pages like Facebook and Twitter can empower marginalized social and political groups, such as young people and women, and expose society to powerful global forces.

The development of modern communication technologies can also have significant social, political and security implications, as the use of these communication technologies by extremist and militant groups.

This research focuses on Afghanistan and examines the role of social media at the level of “speech” in this process.
This paper seeks to understand the sources of strength of armed non-state actors and to explain why stronger state actors have sustained difficulties in defeating them on the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The working paper is divided into four sections. First, it demonstrates a historical change in battle/conflict outcomes involving armed state actors (represented by incumbent governments or regimes) and armed non-state actors (represented by rebels or insurgents). Second, it gives an overview of the main explanations in the Security and Strategic Studies scholarly literature explaining that historical change in outcomes. The third part focuses on the extreme case of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) Organisation (previously known as ISIS/Daesh), and how state actors have dealt with it. Finally, the paper analyses the military impact of Daesh’s foreign fighters. The final section of the paper provides some concluding observations.
Violent extremism threatens democratic principles across the country and represents a significant growing security concern within the United States. While much attention has been paid to foreign-influenced radicalization and terrorism, there has been a significant increase in activity classified as Violent Far-Right Extremism (VFRE) in the past decade (Pitcavage, 2005). VFRE is used to describe groups and individuals that adhere to violent white supremacist ideology and can encompass an assortment of organizations to include Neo-Nazis, White Nationalists, Skinheads, Neo-Confederates, Ku Klux Klan, Anti-Immigrant, and Anti-LGBT, among others (Beirich and Buchanan, 2018). These organizations have a lengthy history of criminal violence that includes mass murder, physical assaults, home invasions, property crimes, counterfeiting, and acts of terrorism (Simi, Smith, and Reeser, 2008).

While VFRE activity has been on the rise since 2009, alarming recent evidence has shown a considerable increase in the infiltration of VFRE views into the mainstream. An August 2017 poll found that 9% of Americans – equivalent to about 22 million people – found it acceptable to hold Neo-Nazi or White Supremacist views (“Trump Approval, “ 2017). Relatedly, Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) found that the number of hate groups rose to 954 from 917 the prior year, up four percent, with some groups within the white supremacist movement seeing growth as high as 22% in just one year. These groups, such as Identity Evropa, have introduced sophisticated messaging campaigns to community and educational institutions, most notably using their recruitment techniques on college campuses (Beirich and Buchanan, 2018).

This growth in VFRE participation and activism resulted in unprecedented violence in 2017. According to the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University at San Bernadino, hate crimes in the six largest U.S. cities were up 20% from 2016. And in the Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL’s) annual assessment of extremist-related killings, it was found that white supremacists and other far-right extremists were responsible for 59% of all extremist-related fatalities in the U.S., up dramatically from 20% in 2016 (“Murder and Extremism in the United States,” 2017). Perhaps the most significant event to emerge in 2017 was the August 12 “Unite the Right” gathering in Charlottesville, which became the largest white supremacist rally in at least a decade and acted as a watershed moment for the VFRE movement for two reasons: 1) this event brought together neo-Confederates, neo-Nazis, militiamen, Ku Klux Klan, and other elements of a movement that is usually debilitated by infighting, demonstrating a first of its kind unification between the factions (Beirich and Buchanan, 2018), and 2) the event became a marker of the more problematic trend of a new willingness by racist groups to put themselves front and center on the American public stage (Greenblatt, 2017).
The evidence and data are clear: VFRE is on the rise, members of the movement feel emboldened, and activities have moved beyond hateful speech to violent action. The ADL’s Center on Extremism recommends that federal and state officials support properly crafted programs to counter all forms of violent extremism, including that stemming from domestic extremist movements, or to facilitate people interested in leaving extremist movements. These programs must emphasize the responsibility of the community and civic leaders to combat the rising tide of VFRE and ensure the safety of fellow citizens. These communities require resources, collaboration and coordination to effectively prevent violent extremism.

This presentation addresses the growing threat of violent far-right extremism and highlights best practices and current strategies used by Life After Hate in its ExitUSA TM and other organizational efforts. The efficacy of the approach is verified through positive outcomes rooted in evidence-based practices, compassion, forgiveness and reconciliation, while emphasizing the importance of accountability. The presentation will also offer new solutions to countering hate speech online and offline. These counter narratives will both affect and improve the care givers as well as the people they are trying to serve.

- https://www.adl.org/media/9471/download
- https://www.adl.org/media/10827/download
- https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/white-supremacist-propaganda-surges-on-campus
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01639620701873905
The works of William Luther Pierce do not appear on many bestseller lists, nor is his name often discussed alongside the most impactful authors of the 20th century. However among his literary repertoire are some of the most infamous, inflammatory and sadly influential American novels of the last 50 years. Writing under the pseudonym of ‘Andrew Macdonald’, Pierce penned both The Turner Diaries and Hunter, which together have formed something of a scriptural canon for extreme-right activists. The Turner Diaries alone has become one of the most widely-distributed racist tracts in recent history, and has directly influenced perpetrators of extremist violence across the globe. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was known to distribute copies and excerpts of the book at gun shows across the American midwest in the early 1990s, and the bombing itself was almost a word-for-word re-enactment of an attack detailed in the book, during which a federal building was bombed using a van packed with ammonium-nitrate explosives. In Germany, copies of both The Turner Diaries and Hunter were found on the scorched hard-drive of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, who alongside Beate Zschäpe were responsible for a decade-long campaign of anti-Turkish violence, in which nine died and many more were injured. With The Turner Diaries acting as a handbook for terror and Hunter outlining the racial ideology of the movement and the system of ‘leaderless resistance’, the works of Pierce have combined to create a detailed manifesto for violent racist activism. Their global distribution and dissemination has inspired violence and racist praxis in southern Africa, the United States, Australia, and across Europe.

While Pierce’s novels appear in the footnotes of many scholarly analyses of the far-right, his work has received surprisingly little academic attention. Their role as social and activist manuals warrants some close examination, and as such this paper will offer an intersectional analysis of Pierce’s work, exploring the ways in which he constructs identity and builds upon existing far-right social norms. By specifically analyzing Pierce’s construction of gender in the two books we can begin to unpack the much more complex question of gender politics across the far-right spectrum. Pierce’s status as a far-right ‘intellectual’ and his work’s influence among extremist circles would suggest that his two major novels might offer something of a blueprint for both white masculinity and femininity. This paper will unpack and analyze the constructions of both white masculinity and femininity in Hunter and The Turner Diaries, exploring the ways in which Pierce expresses and builds upon extreme-right norms. Furthermore, the paper will examine the sexual and racial politics that Pierce outlines in his work, studying the intersections between race, gender, and sexuality in both novels. By analyzing the ways in which he constructs and intertwines race, sexuality and gender in his books, I hope to shed light on the social weltanschauung of Pierce, and perhaps more importantly the influence that his writing has had on his extreme-right audience and contemporaries.
The territorial losses that Islamic State had suffered since the peak of the caliphate in 2014 foreshadowed the failure of the organization, but not that of its ideology. According to a 2015 report of the Soufan Group, Tunisia was the leading country in the ranking of recruitment to ISIS with approximately 6000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq but some sources estimated this number to reach even 7 000, including 700 women involved in Jihad Al Nikah and another 1 500 fighters in the neighbouring Libya. Despite of the numbers being reduced later by the Tunisian authorities to approximately 2 926, the threat of terrorist attacks that recently rocked the capital on 27 June 2019 are proofs that the phenomenon of violent(!) radicalization in Tunisia cannot be neglected. The general circumstances that evolved after the Arab Spring are seen as an accelerator of the proliferation of extremist ideologies and violent activities, but the causes are much deeper and can be traced back to the unique historical, political and economic evolution of the North African country.

Breaking with previous studies that focused on rather describing than explaining this phenomenon, the paper aims to shed light on the root causes of violent radicalization through the case study of Tunisia, the biggest country of issue of jihadi fighters at the peak of the caliphate. Embedded into a complex model of the path to violent(!) radicalization and applying a multidisciplinary approach, the paper analyzes the root causes and far-reaching effects of radicalization on the Tunisian society that is also a result of previous domestic and external political practices, economic and cultural factors. The political, social and economic deficiencies deeply rooted in the authoritarian leadership of Bourguiba and Ben Ali created such challenges that largely contributed to the violent(!) radicalization of the Tunisian youth. Although the research question focuses on whether a possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to violent / extremist ideologies does exist, the complexity of the issue of violent radicalization requires the analysis of the political, social, cultural and even conceptual domains, too. Conceptual analysis is essential as radicalism means fundamental and therefore cannot be used as a synonym of extremism. It is indispensable to mention that the possible correlation of the aforementioned two variables, poverty and receptivity to extremist ideologies, has launched a wide debate among scholars themselves that led to their being split on this issue.
Besides giving a brief outlook on the conceptual framework of violent(!) radicalization and the distinction between radicalism and terrorism, the multidisciplinary approach will be applied through the reconsideration of the work of Veldhuis and Staun entitled Islamist Radicalization: A Root Cause Model. Veldhuis and Staun demonstrated the major causes of this phenomenon on both micro and macro levels, therefore, the paper also seeks to reveal the root causes of violent radicalization through the application of this approach. Indicating unemployment and literacy rates of the different regions of the country requires primary data collection that also helps to accept or refuse the direct causation between the aforementioned variables of economic marginalization and violent radicalization. In order to answer the central research question, it is essential to compare the statistical data of the regions that issue the biggest number of jihadi fighters with data from regions affected the most by unemployment and illiteracy.

Since the paper seeks to combine a complex analysis of economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the relevant topic in a rather newly born democracy, it is able to serve as a guideline by offering possible ways for other governments to tackle the spread of extremist ideologies in the future.
“I saw it with my own eyes. They used to tell these young kids that if they carried out suicide bombings, all their troubles would be over, and they would go straight to paradise.”

Mohammad, former ISIS Child Soldier

The attention towards the recruitment of children into terrorist and extremist organizations and groups has visibly increased over the past years, not least because the Islamic State has developed a comprehensive (social) media strategy to publicize their use of children as active fighters in jihad. With ISIS having lost a considerable amount of territory, a large number of these children are currently being held in refugee camps. It is becoming obvious that their previous indoctrination is deeply rooted inside of them and will continue to influence them further, if no active measures are taken to properly deal with this new generation of child soldiers in a timely and appropriate manner.

This paper finds that it is imperative to address this subject in a holistic form. Thus, it incorporates the civilian approach of prevention, deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration, as well as the military approach by determining for both approaches implications that may emerge from the herein addressed issue in the future. In order to identify the right starting points for intervention, ISIS’ recruitment strategy was investigated, using information obtained from primary sources like Dabiq and propaganda videos distributed by ISIS online. Furthermore, relevant information was collected from available academic research, as well as newspaper articles and media coverage, including interviews with former Cubs of the Caliphate, a term used by ISIS to describe their child soldiers. Evaluation of the collected material shows, that ISIS is exercising its influence over these children in two distinct types, structural recruitment, as well as predatory recruitment, the later exhibiting various similarities to the sexual grooming behaviors of child molesters, especially regarding the initial approach of the child, as well as the isolation from its safe and familiar environment. Since one of the Islamic State’s objectives is to raise the next generation of jihad fighters, they explicitly target children to compliment adult fighters and thus enhance their overall fighting capacities. In general, this multifaceted recruitment approach can be summarized in six distinct stages, namely Seduction, Schooling, Selection, Subjugation, Specialization, and Stationing.

An understanding of these steps and types of recruitment is crucial in order to develop prevention strategies and appropriate programs to achieve complete deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration. To this day, most programs have been designed based on information gained and lessons learned from child...
soldiers in Africa. But since the recruitment approach utilized by most violent groups on the African continent differs immensely from Daesh's approach, the conditions of a successful deradicalization program are, in turn, different ones as well. However, efforts to create appropriate programs are already on their way, albeit still being in a relatively early stage of their development.

It was also found that effectively dealing with this new generation of child soldiers requires a military component. An in-depth understanding of these radicalization methods imperatively contributes to military operations in general, since better knowledge allows for better mission preparation and training.

Both, the civilian, as well as the military approach, require extensive cooperation and information sharing within the global community. Especially now, where returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTF’s), among them multiple children, are increasingly becoming a pressing issue for the global community, the way ahead for dealing with this new generation of child soldiers must be to collectively establish appropriate programs and consistent guidelines within our society. A coordinated and well-structured approach is the only way to effectively and sustainably ensure global stability and security in the long-term.


2 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is more commonly known as the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. In the course of this paper, all four denominations will be used equally.

3 Dabiq is a propaganda magazine created by ISIS and published between July 2014 and July 2016, specifically to address and recruit foreign terrorist fighters.

4 These labels were first introduced by Horgan et. al in: Horgan, John G./Taylor, Max/Bloom, Mia/Winter, Charlie (2017): From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State, in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 40 (7), 645-666.